The impact that the francoist autarkic economic policy had on the Spanish economy is assessed using the Domestic Resource Cost (DRC) as an indicator. This indicator compares the real opportunity cost of the primary factors used in the production of a certain good with its aggregated value at international prices.
Introduction
In recent years, a large volume of literature has addressed the empirical and theoretical shortcomings of studies which have attempted to explore the relationship between trade policy and growth.
1 As a result, this relationship is considered an open and somewhat controversial question. However, there is little doubt that the distortions created by a highly protectionist policy can lead to inefficient resource allocation, which in turn seriously affects accumulation and hence growth 2 . This paper offers an approximation of the resource misallocation produced by the autarkic policy in Spain, measured by the Domestic Resource Cost (DRC), in order to assess the cost to the Spanish economy of the deviation from the international specialisation pattern.
DRC is primarily an indicator of comparative advantage, as it provides an intersectoral comparison of the relative efficiency of the economy in production across sectors. Since it does not take into account actual trade flows, the DRC can be a good substitute for other indicators when barriers to trade have a significant influence on the configuration of the trade structure. Moreover, examined in conjunction with the goals and incentives supplied by economic policy, the DRC can also be used as an indicator of the impact of restrictions to external trade. It provides an approximation of the effects of trade policy on the efficiency of the allocation of production resources and hence of the influence of trade policy on the productive structure in a country.
In the post-war decades many developing countries followed an import substitution policy with the aim of rapid industrialisation. The main features of import substituting policies were complex exchange and import control systems, intense public direct intervention in industrial production and factor and goods price regulations. In general, such policies implied considerable distortions of the price system resulting in significant losses of allocative efficiency. Spain, which had started its import substituting policies in 1939, maintained its inward looking development strategy for nearly another two decades. It is widely recognised that this autarkic development policy had a negative impact on its economic growth.
The argument is that the isolationist policies and the intense interventions created many distortions in the Spanish economy, which prevented efficient resource allocation. However, it is not clear how big an impact these policies actually had.
Some authors believe that these policies, which focused mainly on industrial development, had a crippling effect on the Spanish economy, while others point out the sustained growth of the Spanish industrial sector during the 1950s to argue that the distortions were not so great.
The DRC has been calculated for the Spanish industrial sector in 1958.
This is the last year in which autarkic policies were in effect, and the year in which the first input-output table of the Spanish economy was compiled. Thus, this year provided the best possible data source to analyse the effects of the autarkic economic policy before it was abandoned. Our results indicate that in fact the Spanish economy suffered considerable efficiency losses and that industrial production could have been significantly increased simply by reallocation of productive factors among different sectors. The DRC is a static measure and hence does not capture any dynamic effects. In any case, allocative inefficiency could have only contributed negatively to long-term economic growth. The rapid expansion of the Spanish economy that followed the stabilisation and liberalisation plan of 1959 suggests a great degree of allocative inefficiency due to twenty years of intervention and, equivalently, a large scope for reallocation in the Spanish industrial sector at the end of the interventionist period.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 1 discusses the concept of domestic resource cost and its measure. Section 2 presents the case of the Francoist policy as an example of industrialisation through import substitution. Section 3 describes our methodology for the estimation of DRCs for the Spanish industry in 1958. In section 4 we present our results and discuss them in the light of previous studies. Section 5 concludes.
The domestic resource cost as a measure of comparative advantage
The DRC was first applied by the economic authorities of Israel in the 1950´s as an instrument in project appraisal, used as a investment criterion (Bruno 1963 and . This indicator became popular after the publications of Bruno and Krueger (1968) in the 1960´s where the DRC was already used as an ex post indicator of the effect of economic policy in Israel and Turkey. With same aim, Banerji and Donges (1974) The idea behind DRC is to compare the domestic cost of producing a certain good with its value added at international prices. According to comparative advantage theory, in the absence of any distortions, like tariffs or exchange restrictions, the domestic can differ from international production cost because of technological factors or resource endowment. The DRC can be seen as a measurement of the Ricardian concept of comparative advantage based on technological factors, which would be given by the physical factor intensities. At the same time, factor prices can be seen as the result of the relative scarcity of a country's factor endowments. The more abundant a factor is the lower its relative price will be, and consequently those goods that are produced intensively using this factor will have lower DRC. In this way, the Heckscher-Ohlin contribution to the Ricardian theory would be also integrated in this index. Thus, DRC represents an integrated indicator of the comparative advantage of a country (Schydlowsky, 1984) .
In the calculation of DRC, factor prices should reflect real opportunity cost which not always are captured by market prices. Price distortions can originate from imperfections of the markets or state interventions. Both factors are especially important in less developed countries. In this sense it should be noted that the DRC is a broad measure, since it incorporates not only the distortions created by tariff and exchange control policy but also other existing distortions in the economy at a point in time. These include, for instance, distortions created by state commerce, regulations of the financial sector, restrictions to foreign investment or the effect of labour policy. For this reason, the DRC has been considered the ideal instrument to measure the efficiency loss in less developed countries where the distortions in the economy are the result of a wide range of interventions by the state that go well beyond tariffs.
Using the standard notation of input-output tables, the DRC can be The ratio compares the cost of producing a unit of a certain good with the cost of importing the same good. Therefore DRC can be also be interpreted as a measure of the cost of saving (producing) a foreign currency unit by means of an import substitution policy (export promotion policy), which makes it more appealing in cases where foreign exchange is relatively scarce, as in many developing countries. Usually, however, the production of a certain good not only requires primary factors but also raw materials and intermediates, than can be either domestically manufactured or imported. As imported inputs are a foreign exchange cost that reduces value added at international prices, the calculation of the DRC must take this cost into account. Formally the DRC for a particular good or sector, i, can be defined as Moreover, it is also possible that some foreign factors are involved in the production process so that it would be also necessary to deduct the repatriated income of foreign owned primary factors. Then we have
where all international prices have been normalised to unity and:
r fi = requirements of imported factor f in the domestic production of a unit of
In the denominator of the former expression we have then the difference between the international value of a certain good and the foreign exchange paid for imported raw materials and primary factors. This is the net foreign exchange earned or saved by the economic activity. On the other hand, in the numerator we find the domestic real cost of production or the real added value generated in this activity. Therefore the DRC compares the real opportunity cost of the primary factors used in the production of goods with their value added at international prices.
The bigger the DRC is, the bigger is the opportunity cost for the country in producing a particular good. This is in the same way a smaller DRC reflects a lower domestic opportunity cost of producing a certain good. Moreover, the bigger the dispersion of DRC among sectors, the bigger the level of distortion to which an economy is subjected. As Banerji and Donger (1974, p. 3) noted "high and differential DRC are then an indicator of welfare losses resulting from the impact of trade-restricting or trade-promoting measures on relative prices".
There are two alternative concepts of DRC, namely, the direct and the total DRC. 4 Up to this point we have been referring to the total DRC. While the total DRC (TDRC) takes into account the cost of all the factors that are required directly and indirectly to produce i, the direct DRC (DDRC) only considers the cost of the factors employed directly by sector i. Thus DDRC can be used to evaluate the efficiency in each state of the productive process, whereas the TDRC includes in the estimation the efficiency of any earlier stage of the domestic production process. For instance, a high TDRC of motor vehicle production can be the result of an inefficient steel and tyre production industry, while a high DDRC would be a reflection of the inefficiencies of the motor vehicle production sector itself. Hence, comparison of both measures of DRC for a particular sector will allow us to assess to what extent the loss of efficiency in the final sector is due to earlier stages in the production process.
The Spanish autarkic policy
Spain is a good example of the inward looking economic policies applied in less developed countries after the Second World War. After the Spanish Civil War (1936-39) , authorities decided to force the rapid industrialisation of the country. Even though economic policy in Spain contained an idiosyncratic ideological and militaristic component, the policy measures that were adopted were very similar to those of other countries. For the first twenty years of the Franco regime economic policy was characterised, on the one hand, by the scope and intensity of state intervention and, on the other hand, by intense protectionism. As for external economic policy, rigid regulation of external relations tried to compensate for the sustained overvaluation of the peseta. A complex web of quotas and bilateral agreements accompanied by a very restrictive exchange control system affected both commercial and financial operations, isolating the Spanish economy from any form of external competition (Martínez Ruiz, 2000) .
Another staple of Francoist economic policy was heavily regulated capital markets. The banking sector was subject to very strict regulations, which extended from regulated interest rates, both for passive and active operations, to the imposition of compulsory investment coefficients (Pons, 1999 and 2001) .
Pons shows that the main objective of the regulation of financial markets was to bias resource allocation in favour of the authorities' preferred sectors (Pons, 1999) . Foreign investors were restricted by law from owning more than 25 percent of the equity of any firm. This, along with the fact that it was very difficult to repatriate any eventual profits, made Spain a very unattractive country for foreign investment.
Direct intervention in the industrial sector is another main feature of
Francoist economic policy at the time. The creation of the Instituto Nacional de Industria (INI) marked the first important step of this interventionist policy. The INI, created in 1941, was responsible for undertaking the investments necessary to achieve rapid industrialisation. In principle, the INI's main objective was to achieve self-sufficiency in those sectors directly or indirectly related to the country's defence and in those activities that were considered basic for the economy, such as the production of machinery and equipment and intermediates.
According to the literature, the autarkic economic policy led to serious distortions that were detrimental to economic growth. In this respect the government's preference for heavy industry, implemented mostly through public direct investment, and isolation from international markets have been heavily criticised. The high capital intensity of the INI's activities and the lack of consideration of economic criteria such as opportunity cost or profitability of the investment policy represented a waste of scarce resources (Martín Aceña and Comín, 1992; Prados and Sanz, 1996) , while intense protectionism prevented the exploitation of the benefits of specialisation and economies of scale and made unnecessary any search for efficiency in production. (Donges, 1976; Catalan, 1995; Prados and Sanz, 1996) . The overvaluation of the peseta made it impossible for Spanish exports to take advantage of the buoyant situation of European economy. Export stagnation and restrictions to foreign investment made foreign exchange a very scarce resource. This scarcity affected raw material and equipment imports which were indispensable for consolidation of the growth of the Spanish economy. Even more, isolation from international capital markets obliged the Spanish economy to rely on its own saving capacity.
At same time, the protectionist measures increased the price of machinery and equipment, decreasing returns to investment. The rise in prices did not only affect equipment nor was it exclusive to imported inputs. Growing demand in the internal markets, which could not be satisfied due to exchange scarcity and high protection, allowed national producers to obtain some "scarcity premia". As a result, the prices of intermediates and raw materials went up rapidly in the 1950s.
And yet industrial production grew rapidly during the autarkic period.
After 10 years of very slow recovery, the rate of growth in Spanish industry increased notably between 1951 and 1959 5 . This growth has been ascribed to a greater availability of imports, the progressive relaxation of some controls in the domestic markets and the maturation of the big public investment projects of the previous decade (Barciela and others, 2001) . Further, an intense structural change in the secondary sector took place since heavy industry grew more rapidly than the consumer goods sector, mainly because of the intense public investment in those industries. This has led some authors to conclude that state intervention, especially through the INI, and protection were not only positive but indispensable to achieve such rapid development in Spain's industrial sector (Donges, 1976; Braña, Buesa and Molero, 1984) . Nevertheless, as has been
shown by other authors, the same results would have been possible using alternative policies that would have given incentives for private activity.
5 There are different estimates. See Morellá (1992) and Prados de la Escosura (2002) .
Support of industrialisation was an important characteristic of the inward looking strategy of many developing countries at the time. Further, as in many other countries, the Spanish authorities were convinced that private initiative was either unable or unwilling to undertake the effort, so that a rapid industrialisation could only be achieved through direct public intervention. On the other hand, exposure to international market forces would encourage specialisation in primary goods which would accentuate dependency on foreign industrial goods.
Overcoming this dependency was the main goal of the Spanish industrialisation programme, as Francoist economic policy responded to the idea that strong industry was indispensable to guarantee the political independence of the Spanish state. The estimation of the DRC will now be used to evaluate the success of the import substitution policy of Spain in achieving these goals.
The estimation of DRC for the Spanish industrial sector in 1958
The Stabilisation Plan set in motion in July Besides the fact that TDRC considers total requirements and DDRC considers direct requirements, the second term of the numerator is different in both expressions. This term adds to the DRC calculation the primary resources that are needed to produce good i by taking into account the non-tradable inputs that are used in its productive process. 6 This expression therefore is a more comprehensive measure of the domestic cost which is incurred by producing a unit of foreign currency.
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The calculation of the DRC requires that production factors be valued at their real opportunity cost, so it is necessary to calculate a shadow price set. In this respect, the approach adopted has been to estimate their payment in the most probable alternative activity, which means that the shadow prices are understood as the social opportunity cost of using these productive factors in a particular activity. This requires an examination of the factor markets in Spain at the end of the autarkic period.
With respect to the labour market, it was characterised by under employment and administrative measures that were meant to guarantee full employment. This, along with the diverse regulations about minimum wage and social contributions, make it reasonable to think wages were above the opportunity cost of labour, which was the relatively abundant factor in the Spanish economy. Following Greenaway and Milner (1990) a shadow price for labour was calculated by applying a markdown to the prevailing level of wages based on the average wage differential between different labour categories. The shadow price of labour, w S , is thus given by
where ∇ a is the percentage wage differential between agricultural occupation and unskilled occupation in industry and ∇ s is the percentage wage differential between skilled and unskilled occupations in industry and services. These data were unavailable for 1958 so data from the Instituto Nacional de Estadística for 7 It must be noted that none of our estimates of DRC account for the effect of repatriated income of foreign owned primary factors. This exclusion is due partly to data constraints and partly to the negligible role of repatriations in autarkic Spain given the extremely restrictive legislation. the next year, 1959, were used.
8 As a result of this adjustment our estimate for the social wage is 35% below the prevailing level of wages in 1958.
In the case of capital, the calculation was more complex. The intensive regulation of the financial sector distorted the profitability between sectors to the extent that a method similar to that used for labour proved to be infeasible.
Further, not only the magnitude of the distortion but also the sign is difficult to determine. On the one hand the presumed relative scarcity of capital leads us to think that in certain cases the return to capital was below its marginal productivity. That was surely the case for capital invested by banks as a result of the compulsory coefficient or capital borrowed subject to the maximum interest rate legislation. The high rate of indebtedness of Spanish industrial firms also seems to suggest that interest rates may have been below the opportunity cost of capital. On the other hand, the fact that the Spanish economy had a high degree of protectionism and high barriers to entry suggest that at least in some industries it was possible to obtain sustained returns above the opportunity cost of capital.
In order to deal with all these questions, data about profitability rate and the capital structure in each industry would be required but unfortunately these data are not available. An assumption is made that the net effect of government intervention was to set the cost of capital below its true opportunity cost, and a range of estimates of the DRC is obtained by assuming that the social opportunity cost of capital was between 10 and 50 percent higher than the actual rate of return. (Hutchenson and Schydlowsky, 1982) , Argentina in 1969 (Berlinski and Schydlowsky, 1982) and 1973 (Szychowski and Perazzo, 1981) and Turquía (Krueger, 1978) in the late 1960's. As Bhagwati (1978) pointed out such shadow prices "should be regarded essentially as sensitivity estimates" p.90. The chosen range is in line with those used in the aforementioned studies.
The international prices of traded goods, understood as border prices, have been approximated following the standard expression
where d i is the protection level to good i. Each d-factor was calculated based on the prevailing tariff corresponding to the sector division of the I-O table and the penalties (premia) implicit in the multiple exchange rate system applicable in 1958. Specifically, the official exchange rate -42 pesetas/$-is taken as a reference and any rate above (under) this rate is considered a tax (subsidy) for an import good, whereas the opposite is true for export goods. A good is considered an export good if its export-production ratio is higher than 10 percent and if its exports are greater than its imports. In April 1957 a first attempt to rationalise the exchange policy was made when the peseta was devalued from 10.95 pesetas per dollar -the official exchange rate of the peseta from 1939 -to 42 pesetas per dollar.
The devaluation was accompanied by a unification of the exchange rate. However, this measure was reversed a few weeks later and, de facto, the system of multiple exchange rates was restored. At the end of 1958 the multiple exchange rate system had 10 exchange rate categories for exports (ranging from 31 to 95 pesetas per dollar) and 4 for imports (42 to 126 pesetas per dollar). Finally the indirect taxes applicable to imported goods were taken into account. Due to the paucity of disaggregated information, an average tax rate was used.
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In order to determine the activities in which an economy enjoys a comparative advantage, and in which it should therefore specialise, it will be necessary to compare the DRC of each sector with the shadow exchange rate (SER). In an economy with distortions, the DRC can be higher or lower than the SER depending on the sector. If in a particular sector the DRC is higher than the SER this means that it would be possible to use resources in a more efficient way by transferring the productive factors to an alternative activity and importing the good in question. Following the Bruno and Krueger approach, the SER should reflect the social cost of producing a unit of foreign exchange in the economy under study. Since the sectoral DRCs give the cost of producing a unit of foreign exchange in each sector, a widely used solution is to calculate an average or weighted average DRC and to use it as the cut-off point. In our case, the average total DRC of all tradable sectors, including the agricultural sector, has been calculated. This average, α, can be viewed, as noted by Pearson, Akrasanee and Nelson as the average efficiency of all activities producing tradable goods in the economy in transforming domestic resources into foreign exchange (1976, p.88) .
The α-factor can be interpreted as the relationship between official exchange rate and its shadow price (SER), SER = α* E where E is the official exchange rate. The resulting value for α (α = 1.27) implies that the SER would stand at 53.30 ptas/$. This SER is in fact similar to the current exchange rate in the black market located in Tangier (54.99 pts/$). (Martín Aceña, 1989) . The difference between the official exchange rate and the estimated SER (about 27 percent) gives a first indication of the failure of the autarkic policy in allocating resources efficiently. Table 1 11 That means that, although they refer only to the results for this central value, the following comments would be also valid for any value of the shadow price of capital. DRC per dollar very close to the general exchange rate (54.14 pts/$), while the import sectors were among the most inefficient with a shadow exchange rate of 57.63 pts/$. 15 Apart from the food industry and the minerals sector, other sectors had both a low DRC and a high export performance. These include cotton 13 The results are compared with the indicator called by Asensio "relative advantage to trade balance" and defined as VCR it = (( (X it -M it )/(X it +M it )) -( Σ(X it -M it )/Σ(X it +M it ) )) (Asensio,1995, p.322 and 606) . The data she used come from the Trade Statistics compiled by the Dirección General de Aduanas (Department of Customs). 14 Of the 50 main export products 19 were agricultural products and could therefore not be considered. When these sectors are considered the relation between exports and a low TDRC is strengthened. 15 Similar estimates for the Korean economy in 1968 showed significantly worse results for the import competing sector (Westphal and Kim, 1982, p.247) weaving and silk products which were among the efficient sectors according to the DRC criterion and were two of the most important industrial exports at the end of the autarkic period 16 .
Results
The situation of the Spanish economy in 1958 can be compared with that of other developing economies or economies in transition. Among the sectors that obtain high efficiency results are petroleum products and the defence industry. The high degree of efficiency shown by the petroleum sector is probably due to the intensive use of imported inputs in its production process and therefore its weak interrelationship with the domestic economy. 18 In the case of the defence industry, including aircraft, its high ranking position could be explained by the fact that it was a sector highly favoured by the government, although the literature on the Spanish defence industry suggests that this sector was in fact characterised by considerable inefficiency (Martínez Ruiz, 1994; San Román, 1999) . Its position, 37 th among export products, can be explained in part by the existence of small weapons manufacturers producing pistols and hunting arms which are believed to have been relatively competitive.
A substantial proportion of the machinery and equipment sectors is found to be inefficient in the sense of a DRC greater than one. These activities include the motor vehicles industry, most notably automobiles, railroad materials, shipbuilding, the basic iron and steel industry, metal products, building materials and the machinery industry which were some of the most inefficient sectors in the Spanish economy. These were precisely the sectors which the economic authorities wanted to help through their policies. The main aim of Francoist industrial policy was to provide the Spanish economy with a strong and fully-18 It must be pointed out that many authors think that the DRC criterion biases the ranking in favour of those sectors that make an intensive use of imported inputs. (Masters and WinterNelson, 1995) . Not only heavy industry but also some of the most important sectors in the consumer goods industry were in the bottom positions of the efficiency ranking.
Notably the textile sector had a relatively high inefficiency level, despite the fact it was labour intensive, i.e. used the relatively more abundant factor. The same was true for some of the most important sectors in the food and drinks industry.
It can be seen in Table 3 that part of these sectors' inefficiency was caused by other sectors that were inputs to their production. Table 3 ranks each sector with respect to the difference between TDRC and DDRC. Since TDRC reflects the total opportunity cost of converting domestic resources into foreign exchange and the DDRC reflects the same cost but just in the final phase of the production process, the difference between the two is a measure of the inefficiency imposed on a sector by the rest of the economy. 19 The presence of activities in food and drinks in the leading positions in Table 3 suggests that, although many of the basic inputs came from highly efficient agricultural sectors, the efficiency of the wine derivatives, canned vegetables and canned fish sectors was significantly reduced as a result of the inefficiencies of other sectors in the economy, most notably by an inefficient tin production sector in the case of the last two. The results at a more aggregate level are summarised in Table 5 . As expected, the most efficient sector was the so-called export agriculture sector that includes citrus fruits, olive, grapes, bananas, other fruits, nuts and vegetables.
Traditional agriculture was the next most efficient sector. Both sectors have a 19 Banerji and Donges(1974, pp.20, 31-34) on the contrary adjust the calculation if one (or some) of the main productive inputs was imported instead of domestically produced. 20 A similar case is mentioned by Krueger for the Turkish canned food sector (Krueger ,1978, pp.224-225) .
weighted average TDRC below the cut-off point and therefore they can be considered efficient. The lower TDRC in agriculture, both traditional and export agriculture, reinforces the idea that economic policy affected particularly those final products sectors which had a very intense relationship with the domestic productive network, while those sectors where domestic inputs were less necessary or less important, were less affected by intervention and thus were relatively more efficient. However, this does not mean that the traditional agriculture sector was a relatively efficient sector on its own. Its DDRC was the highest in the whole economy which suggests that the opportunity cost of production in traditional agriculture was relatively high.
As for industry, the consumer goods sector obtains the best results, although it cannot be considered efficient, while the highest weighted average TDRC was the equipment and machinery industry. Under the DDRC criterion, the consumer goods industry appears to be remarkably efficient. The large difference between the weighted averages of the TDRC and DDRC shows once again that this sector was the main victim of Francoist policy. The importance and relative efficiency of this sector is further evidenced by the fact that no other industrial sector in the economy obtained a DDRC below the general average.
Moreover, the average results are very similar in all other sectors. This suggests that considered in isolation, that is, without considering the relationships with other sectors in the economy, all sectors -excluding the consumer goods industry-turned domestic resources into foreign exchange at a very similar cost.
Conclusion
This paper attempts to assess the impact that the Francoist economic policy during the autarkic period (1939) (1940) (1941) (1942) (1943) (1944) (1945) (1946) (1947) (1948) (1949) (1950) (1951) (1952) (1953) (1954) (1955) (1956) (1957) (1958) had on the Spanish economy and on individual industrial sectors through an analysis of Domestic Resource Costs (DRC). DRC was estimated for 1958 which marks the end of the autarkic period.
As is common with this type of studies, the main problems revolve around the estimation of shadow prices. The lack of data to calculate the opportunity costs of the productive factors, which are understood as their payment in the most probable alternative activity, has resulted in the need to adopt some strong assumptions on their possible values, especially for the shadow price of capital.
Despite the fact that sensitivity analysis allows us to conclude that the overall results are quite robust to the assumptions made, the details in the case of individual sectors must be taken with a certain degree of caution. 
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